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Abstract 
The inception of the European Monetary Union appeared to have accomplished the 
yields’ convergence goal of Maastricht. Suddenly however, spreads against Germany 
started escalating towards the values of the early nineties. Through the usage of a 
fixed-effects Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimation, this thesis tries to discern the 
role of liquidity and fiscal fundamentals in determining yield differentials for ten 
EMU countries. While markets tend to monitor high debtors via more structural fiscal 
measures, a late and abrupt reaction, as risk perceptions increased, unveiled the 
unannounced fiscal unsoundness of the peripheral. The consequent defaults will put 
into question the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact. In this context, 
unobserved individual effects seem to be the least of our concerns. 





 of January 1999, eleven countries materialized an idea that had been 
conceived in Maastricht, seven years before
1
. One of the main goals of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU henceforth) was to help creating a more integrated bond 
market in Europe, as large and as liquid as the United States’. As countries adopted a 
common currency, the exchange rate risk was eliminated. Hence, the only two 
significant factors that could keep EMU member states’ sovereign bonds imperfect 
substitutes were liquidity, as assets that can be traded instantly with low transaction 
costs should offer lower yields, all else being equal, and the perceived risk of default
2
. 
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 Greece joined 2 years later (1/1/2001). 
2  
In the late nineties, according to Favero et al (1997), virtually all differences in the systems of taxes 
on financial transactions were harmonized. 
 3 
As 1999 approached, yields converged and yield spreads became virtually inexistent
3
. 
Nonetheless, the Euro architects saw fiscal rules as a necessary complement to market 
forces, thus creating the Stability and Growth Pact. In it, they included caps to certain 
key fiscal fundamentals (debt/GDP and deficit/GDP), and also a no-bailout clause. 
As we entered the new millennium however, these limits were already being exceeded, 
a trend that smoothly persisted in almost all member states, for the next decade. Given 
the mild reaction of markets, liquidity was thought to be the most relevant 
determinant of yield differentials which, as raised by Codogno et al (2003), would 
mean that there was scope for greater convergence and efficiency
4
. Recently however, 
a greater focus has been placed on default risk, and more concretely on the soundness 
of fiscal policies adopted by member states. In our days, it has become absolutely 
critical to perfectly disentangle the extent to which these aforementioned determinants 
do play a role. Since the third quarter of 2008 onwards it is not anymore about 
creating a market for the “same bond”. It is about discerning what dragged us to the 
place we are now.  
In our work, we try to answer that question. The estimation of a dynamic panel data 
model allowed us to distinguish two different time periods, which shall be explored 
and compared. Additionally, grouping countries with similar fiscal fundamentals 
enriched both our estimation results, and our understanding of the behavior of 
government bond yield spreads since 1999. Finally, ensuring the stationarity of first-
differenced yield differential series and controlling for two perilous, though often 
forgotten, sources of endogeneity, strengthened our econometric specification, 
yielding more robust results. 
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 Figure A.1. in page 37 portrays the behavior of yield spreads in 4 EMU countries from 1995 to 2013. 
4
 If spreads were explained by the amount of Euro-denominated debt outstanding, then greater fiscal 
integration would immediately lead to higher efficiency and yields’ convergence. 
 4 
The report hereby presented is organized as follows
5
. Section 2. summarizes previous 
research on government bond yield spreads, emphasizing the literature found to be 
more relevant for our work. Methodological procedures are described in 3. and all the 
results from the various specifications employed are displayed in section 4. Section 5. 
derives policy implications and raises the possibilities for further investigation. 
 
2.1. Literature overview: 
The literature on government bond yield spreads is vast and the conclusions are far 
from consensual. Capeci (1991) considered general obligation issues by 136 US 
municipalities to investigate how would markets react to credit quality fluctuations, 
but could not find strong implications to the cost of borrowing. Eichengreen and 
Mody (1998) confirmed that for emerging economies, higher credit quality translates 
into a higher probability of issue and a lower spread, even though fiscal fundamentals 
could only partly explain yields’ compression prior to the nineties’ crises. Alesina et 
al. (1992) regressed the spread between public and private yields of 12 OECD 
countries on their fiscal fundamentals and found that for highly indebted countries, 
the differential between public and private rates of return is positively correlated to 
debt outstanding and to its growth. A recognized pitfall in this work is that during 
sovereign debt crises’ periods, a generalized credit crunch will also affect also private 
yields, which may bias the results against finding significant risks of default. 
Recently, and especially since the EMU’s inception, the focus of the literature shifted 
towards European government bond yield spreads. In this context, a generalized 
approach is using the German Bund as the benchmark, “risk-free” asset. However, 
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 This report comprises 25 pages (pp. 1-25) whose content is complemented by information provided in 
appendix (pp. 26-39). All tables and figures included in the main text are numbered consecutively 
following their order of appearance. The same applies to those included in appendix, being numbers 
preceded by A. for such cases. (Table A.1. corresponds to the first of the appendix, and so forth). 
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common points in what concerns methodology do not go much further than that. 
Indeed, the extensive literature on this topic brings about various model specifications 
and data treatment econometric methods that may well be the root of such contrasting 
conclusions. In the next section, we shall briefly discuss the articles deemed more 
relevant to our work, placing a special focus on their methodology and results. 
 
2.2. Most relevant research pieces for this work: 
Favero et al. (1997) used four years’ daily data (from 1992 to 1995) in trying to 
evaluate the determinants of yield differentials for Italy, Spain and Sweden. They 
identified and measured three different components of yield differentials: the 
expectations of exchange rate depreciation, the different taxation treatments of long-
term yields and a default risk factor
6
. With a vector autoregressive approach, Favero 
et al. (1997) found evidence of cointegration between yield spreads and exchange rate 
factors, and of uni-directional causality running from the exchange rate factor to the 
yield differential. Overall, they support that there is a common trend for the analyzed 
yield spreads, that is independent of country-specific shocks, may those be fiscal or 
other. Apart from the limitations VAR methodology may have, pointed by Gale and 
Orszag (2003), it seems clear that daily frequencies limit the relevance fiscal 
fundamentals may have
7
. Another factor that Favero et al. (1997) disregarded is 
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 While the exchange rate risk factor was measured by the interest rate swap differential between 
country i’s and German bonds, the default risk factor was taken as the residual of the difference 
between the observed yield differential and the aforementioned exchange rate risk factor. This 
methodology, first introduced by Favero et al. (1997), is of great relevance in government bond yield 
spreads’ literature, and will thus be used in our work. As to tax treatment effects, it should be noted that 
these were only relevant for Italy, and as was previously described in footnote 2, became irrelevant 
from 1995 onwards. 
7 
Gale and Orszag (2003) argue that VAR projection is essentially backward looking, and in this 
particular context will fail to incorporate information that may be widely available to market 
participants about future events. Regarding the limitations daily frequencies impose on fiscal data, 
these arise because daily fiscal data is not available. So, either one uses linear extrapolations of 
quarterly or monthly data (which is not a good solution) or, like Favero et al. (1997), chooses to use 
 6 
liquidity, which has been consistently shown to be an influential determinant of yield 
differentials. Considering that the use of daily frequencies allows for a thorough 
inclusion of liquidity determinants such as bid-ask spreads and trading volumes, the 
aforementioned choice becomes even more intriguing
8
.  
Balassone et al. (2004) used a sample of fourteen EU countries over the period of 
1981-2003 to test whether the stance of fiscal policy reacted to either market or 
agency perceptions of government creditworthiness. The dependent variable used was 
the structural primary balance as a percentage of GDP, regressed on the debt/GDP 
ratio, and the formerly mentioned assessments of sovereign risk
9
. Even though it does 
not answer to the exact same question as ours, the work of Balassone et al. (2004) is 
of invaluable interest for two reasons. The first relates to its conclusions: they suggest 
that not only market reactions to deteriorating fiscal fundamentals tend to be slow and 
small in size, but also that fiscal corrections tend to be significantly delayed even after 
markets’ alarms ring. The power of these conclusions begs the suggestion to extend 
Balassone et al.’s (2004) work to the field of political economy
10
. The second reason 
is the fact that Balassone et al. (2004) undoubtedly show that reverse causality should 
be taken into account in the literature on government bond yield spreads.  
Codogno et al. (2003) used a dataset of monthly observations from 1991 to 2002 for 
10 EMU countries, and defined liquidity and default risk as the relevant determinants 
of yield differentials
11
. A number of relevant controls were imposed to capture 
                                                                                                                                                              
default risk measures such as credit ratings, which will tend to also incorporate factors other than fiscal 
fundamentals. 
8
 Many authors such as Gómez-Puig (2006) actually dispute liquidity to be the most relevant 
determinant of government bond yield spreads. This option by Favero et al. (1997) probably lies on the 
unavailability of the aforementioned data, even though the author did not address that issue. 
9 All independent variables were one year lagged, which determined the use of Arellano-Bond fixed-
effects dynamic panel estimation. 
10
 Possible political and country-specific controls are mandates lifespan or political orientation (left-
right). 
11
 Different tax treatments were taken as irrelevant, even though this should be seen as a simplification 
in the case of Italy in the first years of the period under analysis. Furthermore, to eliminate the 
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banking and corporate sectors’ risk and a dynamic adjustment was allowed for
12
. 
These variables proved significant when interacted with fiscal fundamentals, which is 
explained by the changing risk perceptions regarding EMU countries’ bonds. 
Additionally, liquidity seems to play a role, though these estimations can be criticized. 
Codogno et al. (2003) could not find liquidity variables for any year other than 2002, 
and hence fails to regress liquidity and fiscal fundamentals altogether.  
Bernoth et al. (2004) constructed a portfolio model of bond yield differentials by 
maximizing a utility function depending positively on expected real wealth and 
negatively on its variance. By using quarterly observations between 1993 and 2005, 
for fourteen EU countries, and having only considered bonds denominated either in 
Euro or in US dollar, Bernoth et al. (2004) found another way to avoid dealing with 
exchange rate premiums
13
. The results from the estimation of a simple static panel 
indicate that liquidity became irrelevant after the inception of the EMU. Like 
Codogno et al. (2003), Bernoth et al. (2004, 2012) found fiscal fundamentals to be 
quite significant, especially when interacted with risk perception measures and with a 
Crisis dummy variable
14
. Interestingly enough, Bernoth et al. (2004, 2012) found 
quite robust statistical evidence for non-linear relationships between yields and fiscal 
fundamentals, which Bayoumi et al. (1995) had already described as “credit 
punishing” effects.  
                                                                                                                                                              
exchange rate risk from Codogno et al.’s (2003) work relative assets swap spreads (RASS) were used. 
These RASS respect to the spread between the sovereign yield curve and the interest rate swap of the 
same maturity, as explained in footnote 5, p. 4. 
12
 Codogno et al. (2003) include the spread between US’ interest rate swaps and government 
instruments, and also between Moody’s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds and, once again, 
government instruments. 
13
 Prior to 1999, bonds denominated in Deutsche Marks (DM) were used (instead of Euro). However, 
by considering yields-at-issue and all bond issues during the time period covered, it is clear that the 
quantity of data among time periods is heterogeneous. If such heterogeneity is related with the yields 
themselves, there could be some self-selection bias. Yet, this is a question our work will not address. 
14
 Bernoth et al. (2004) computed a risk perception measure similar to Codogno et al.’s (2003), but 
used instead the yields of US BBB corporate bonds. In 2012, Bernoth et al. made an extension to their 
work, whereby the methodology used is identical. Hence, from here on, while methodology issues will 
only refer to the first work, those regarding results may refer to both, if applicable.  
 8 
Lastly, by taking advantage of a unique dataset on liquidity variables, and by using 
daily data on Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s credit ratings to measure the risk of 
default, Gómez-Puig (2006) concluded that liquidity was the main determinant of 
government bond yield spreads in the 10 EMU countries under analysis
15
. This goes 
against the aforementioned findings of Bernoth et al. (2004, 2012). One last important 
aspect about the work of Gómez-Puig (2006) is the panel estimation using Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares, which according to Cameron and Trivedi (2005) fails to 
take advantage of the richness of a panel dataset. 
 
3.1. Data description and methodology: 
 
In our work, we used quarterly data from 1999 to 2013 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
16
.  
The baseline specification for our long panel dataset is the following: 
 
 is the yield differential and is given by: 
 
 and are the yields to maturity of 10-year government bonds issued by 
country i and Germany, respectively
17
. These daily data were collected in Bloomberg 
and for the sake of comparison were selected not to pay any coupon until maturity. 
Amemiya and Wu (1972) showed that temporal aggregation of a variable that follows 
an autoregressive process will create artificial serial correlation, and therefore we 
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 The liquidity variables used were bid-ask spreads and the amounts of debt outstanding. Note that the 
amounts of debt outstanding are quarterly data, on which Gómez-Puig (2006) undertook a linear 
extrapolation thus getting daily data. Such methods are subject of great discussion in the econometric 
community, and as a result will not be followed in our work. The sample period is between January 
1996 and December 2001. 
16
 Out of the 11 countries that joined the EMU in 1999, we excluded Germany (which serves as our 
benchmark) and Luxembourg. Greece, who joined on the 1
st
 of January 2001, is included in our work. 
17 
As mentioned in section 2.2., p. 4, this methodology has been widely used in this literature. As can 
be easily understandable, it controls for systemic shocks that may affect the Euro area as a whole. 10-
year bonds are used both because of their liquidity in the market, and their lower volatility. 
 9 
decided to use last period observations for each quarter.  is the lagged yield 
differential.  
  comprises four different groups of regressors that we shall divide as: i) fiscal 
fundamentals; ii) liquidity factors; iii) risk-related factors; and iv) control variables.  
The fiscal fundamentals include the commonly used debt/GDP and deficit/GDP ratios, 
interest payments/government revenues and the variation in expenditures with public 
servants. The inclusion of the interest payments/government revenues ratio is inspired 
in Bernoth et al. (2004) and tries to capture the impact that interest payments (and 
therefore, the debt burden) may have on governments’ ability to raise taxes for any 
given level of GDP
18
. Note that the aforementioned fiscal variables were lagged one 
period in order to control for reverse causality. The variation in expenditure with 
public servants attempts to control for two kinds of phenomena. First, it tries to 
capture public over-spending especially in the years after the EMU’s inception. 
Second, it attempts to unveil the degree of hysteresis on this kind of government 
expenditure, especially in the crisis period. It allows us to evaluate the credibility of 
expenditure cuts’ announcements and the extent to which governments have the 
flexibility to adjust to budgetary shocks. A state that is less able to adjust to those 
shocks is expected to pay a premium for that lack of fiscal and political authority. All 
fiscal data were taken from Eurostat
19
. Liquidity was measured using the share of 
Euro-denominated debt outstanding, taken from the Bank of International Settlements. 
Two other variables could be important to assess liquidity of government bonds: the 
bid-ask spread and trading characteristics such as volume and intensity
20
. However, if 
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 Bernoth et al. (2004) use a ratio given by debt service payments over total government revenues. 
19
 We collected not seasonally adjusted data, and then applied the tramo/seats filter package on EViews. 
20
 Trading characteristics are hardly available and are therefore rarely found in the literature. As to bid-
ask spreads, it should be stated that between EMU countries, secondary market characteristics such as 
admission and trading rules or clearing and settlement procedures tend to be relatively standardized, 
and hence amounts of debt outstanding is probably the liquidity measure with greatest variability. This, 
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one considers EMU countries it is plausible to suggest that the amounts outstanding 
will be the measure with the greatest variability. Indeed, Codogno et al. (2003) found 
debt volumes to be the best performing liquidity indicators and Bernoth et al. (2004) 
restricted their liquidity measures to Euro and US Dollar-denominated debt 
outstanding. Gómez-Puig (2006), on the other hand, attributes great importance to 
liquidity factors in explaining government bond yield spreads and found, unlike 
Codogno et al. (2003), that the efficiency in the secondary market is highly  
statistically significant
21
. Still, our liquidity measure is expected to have a significant 
negative impact on government bond yield spreads. 
Perceived market risk is measured by the spread between the yield on Moody’s 
Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds and the yield on 10-year US government bonds. 
In this particular, we took into account Kamin et al. (1999) and Eichengreen et al. 
(2000), whose literature on sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets shows that 
spreads are quite sensitive to US risk factors. Additionally, we partly followed 
Codogno et al. (2003) who used this same measure for EMU countries from 1991 to 
2002. Risk-related data were taken from Bloomberg.  
Finally, GDP growth was used in all specifications as a control variable
22
. 
As to the error , we have that: 
 
Above, corresponds to the individual-specific effects and  to the idiosyncratic 
error. Our methodology will be contingent upon the correlation between individual-
specific effects,  and the regressors  (and ). As we believe that 
                                                                                                                                                              
if true, contributes to its quality as an econometric control. Additionally, the correlation matrix in page 
36 of the appendix rules out multicollinearity issues. For our work, data on bid-ask spreads could not 
be gathered. 
21
 As discussed in section 2.2, p. 7 bid-ask spreads, that serve as a proxy for secondary markets’ 
efficiency, were found to be highly statistically significant in the work of Gómez-Puig (2006).   
22 
Table A.6 in p.35 of the appendix is a summary statistics table of the variables in our baseline 
specification. 
 11 
unobserved heterogeneity encompasses countries’ reputation and trustworthiness, we 
used the wide datasets provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) to establish 
sovereigns’ “track record”. Unfortunately, a robust Hausman test rejected the null that 
the residual unobserved effects were random, thus forcing us to abandon our measures 




3.2. Dynamic panel estimation: 
Given that our default specification includes lags of the dependent variable, we will 
use a Arellano-Bond fixed-effects dynamic panel estimation
24
. It is clear that within 
transformations yield inconsistent estimates, as is correlated with by 
construction. Note additionally that first-differencing to eliminate individual effects 
will generate a moving average (MA) process with unit root in Therefore, the 
consistency of the Arellano-Bond estimator is contingent upon the fact that:  
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 Based on the work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who built a comprehensive database on several 
types of crises in world economies, we included variables that aim to capture the “track record” effect 
on yield spreads. Concretely, we used variables based on the share of years country i faced a default or 
re-scheduling on its debt (both domestic and external), the share of years country i faced inflation 
peaks (with three different levels being considered: over 20%, over 40%, and hyperinflation) and the 
share of years country i had banking crises. We chose to consider information dating back to 1850, and 
excluding the period under analysis in our work. A detailed description of the available data for the 
countries in our sample is: Austria (1880), Belgium (since 1850), Finland (1914), France (1880), 
Germany (1880), Greece (1869), Ireland (no data), Italy (1880), Netherlands (1880), Portugal (1851) 
and Spain (1850). By doing so, we could present a group of time-invariant variables that may reflect 
the reputation and trustworthiness of a country, when controlling for all fiscal, liquidity and risk-related 
factors. As described by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), although such variables do capture some of the 
compounding dimensions of the crisis experience, they admittedly remain incomplete measures of its 
severity. Moreover, giving similar weights to every year in our sample would be a clear 
oversimplification. Finally it should be stated that Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) developed a Composite 
Index of Crises that, although taking into account a time dimension, has the exact same problems ours 
has. Although we failed to be able to use this dataset, it is our belief that it can be extremely useful for 
future developments in the literature of government bond yield spreads.  
24
 Alternatively, a random-effects model would regard individual heterogeneity, , as being 
uncorrelated with the independent variables. As stated beforehand, robust Hausman test results reject 
such scenario, meaning that the random-effects estimator would be inconsistent under the alternative 
hypothesis. The p-value of the test is 0.0057, thus leading us to reject the null for any conventional 
significance level. 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed panel GMM estimators that use unbalanced 
instrument sets. By using additional lags of the dependent variable as instruments, 
more efficient estimation is attained. Ahn and Schmidt (1995) later derived additional 
nonlinear moment conditions, by making use of second moment assumptions
25
. In this 
context, large time dimensions generate many instruments that can, according to 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005), lead to poor asymptotic performances. Hence, while 
performing computations, it was important to restrict the number of instruments 
used
26
. Our estimation follows Windmeijer (2005) in the sense that it gives us robust 
standard errors that allow for heteroskedasticity in   
It should be noted that our model specification improves those of Bernoth et al. (2004, 
2012), Codogno et al. (2003), Gómez-Puig (2006), from an econometric point of view, 
yielding in our opinion, more consistent results. The literature on government bond 
yield spreads tends to suffer from two important sources of endogeneity, that may 
compromise the robustness of the estimates. First, it seems clear that even when 
working with last period quarterly observations, lagged yield differentials are 
extremely powerful in explaining current yield differentials. In addition, they are 
highly correlated with current and future fiscal fundamentals, thus clearing the way 
for a harmful omitted variable bias problem. Second, endogeneity can also be brought 
into our model via reverse causality
27
. By lagging fiscal variables one period, we 
sacrifice some of the power of our results, but ensure their consistency, which is 
disregarded in the abovementioned literature. Last but not the least, most of the 
aforementioned works rely on the stationarity of the yield differential series. This 
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  = 0. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed these works, 
reaching even more efficient estimation methods to consider in short panels. 
26
 For one-lag estimations, we allowed for two-lag instruments at most.  
27
 Balassone et al. (2004), regress the structural primary balance as a percentage of GDP on the lagged 
government bond yield spread of 14 EU countries relative to Germany (among other variables).  
 13 
could pose serious problems if that assumption is not verified
28
. Fisher-type unit-root 
tests fail to reject the null that the yield spreads series are non-stationary, and reject it 





4.1. Baseline specification results: 
By analysing the results in Table 1 we confirm our conjecture about the considerable 
explanatory power of the first lag of the dependent variable, even though subsequent 
lags proved rather insignificant. Our baseline specification includes the two main fiscal 
fundamentals, debt/GDP and deficit/GDP, and the third variable with which we tried to 
capture fiscal imprudence, interest payments/government revenues. All these variables 
are lagged one period to control for reverse causality. Due to a noticeable degree of 
correlation we computed different equations for each of the aforementioned fiscal 
variables, to which we shall devote our attention
30
. From column B we conclude that a 
10 percentage points increase in the debt/GDP ratio yields an average increase of 38 
basis points in the yield differential. As to the deficit/GDP ratio, a 1 percentage point 
increase is expected to drive yield differentials up by an average amount of 13.3 basis 
points. Finally, if interest payments as a percentage of government revenues go up by 1 
percentage point, yield differentials are supposed to increase 34.9 basis points. Overall, 
the size of these coefficients seems quite reasonable. The results of Kamin et al. (1999) 
and Eichengreen et al. (2000) regarding the spread between US corporate bonds (in our 
case, Moody’s Seasoned AAA) and 10-year government bonds are corroborated in our 
                                                        
28
 According to Brooks (2008), may the variables employed in a regression model be non-stationary, 
and all standard assumptions for asymptotic results will cease to be valid, thus harming all inference 
one may conduct.  
29
 Phillips-Perron tests for yield differentials and yield differentials’ first differences have p-values of 
0.7984 and 0.0000 respectively. Panel Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests mimic the results. Estimations 
were carried away for 4 lags, thus controlling for potential seasonal effects. 
30
 A correlation matrix is displayed on page 36 of the appendix. 
 14 
estimations with appreciable robustness. Considering the specifications in Table 1, if the 
abovementioned spread widens by one percentage point, yield differentials will increase 
by an amount between 18.3 and 31.5 basis points. The share of Euro-denominated debt 
fails to present a robust effect on yield differentials in our baseline specification. Yet, 
column D allows us to conclude that, keeping other factors fixed, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the share of Euro-denominated debt outstanding will decrease yield 
differentials by 34.6 basis points, which follows our expectation described in section 3.1. 
Finally, the coefficient for the variation of public employment’s expenditure is neither 
statistically significant, nor it bears the expected sign. 
Table 1. Baseline specification 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany 
A   B   C   D 





















Debt/GDP 0.025 (1.57) 
 
0.038*** (4.57) 
      
Deficit/GDP -0.051 (0.25) 
    
0.133* (1.95) 
   
Interest payments/ 
government revenues 




 0.349*** (3.89) 
   
Variation of expenditure 
with public servants 
-0.037 (0.92)  -0.039 (0.98)  -0.043 (0.87)  -0.039 (1.00) 
   
            Econometric Controls 
           














            Relevant Statistics 
       














                        
Notes: 
           
(1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
(2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
         
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity. 
  
 
4.2. Low debtors versus high debtors: 
Following the results of Table 1, and taking into account the substantial degree of 
heterogeneity between the countries in our sample, it was deemed relevant to attempt 
to disentangle some of preceding effects. It should be noted that country fixed-effects 
 15 
would vanish in our dynamic panel estimation. Additionally, the author decided not to 
follow the work of Codogno et al. (2003) and chose not to analyse countries 
individually
31
. Hence, we divided these 10 countries into two groups: low debtors and 
high debtors. The critical decision factor was the debt/GDP ratio over the period 
under analysis for two main reasons: first, debt/GDP is one of the two fiscal indicators 
with greatest explanatory power in our baseline specification, and second, it is one of 
the two fiscal fundamentals applicable for the Stability and Growth Pact
32
. Table A.1 
portrays the results for our baseline specification for high and low debtors and the 
differences are remarkable. The lagged dependent variable seems to exert a greater 
influence for low debtors, as the associated coefficient is between 15.6 and 25.3 basis 
points higher. Fiscal variables display impressive contrasts when one compares low 
and high debtors. Regarding the debt/GDP ratio, a 10 percentage points increase leads 
to an average 47 basis points widening in yield differentials for high debtors. For low 
debtors on the other hand, this coefficient is not only quite smaller, it also fails to be 
significant. Columns D and H evaluate the impact interest payments/government 
revenues may have on yield differentials, and the discrepancy between low and high 
debtors is also noteworthy. Following a 1 percentage point increase in the stated 
variable, a high debtor will face an increase in its yield differential that is on average 
36.6 basis points higher than a low debtor. The aforestated comparisons seem to 
indicate that markets look at slightly different fiscal indicators when comparing high 
and low debtors. For the former, the structural stance of fiscal policy is seriously 
                                                        
31
 The author considers that a sample with 56 observations is not big enough to make robust inference. 
Note that Codogno et al. (2003) used 156 monthly observations. It is not explicit if those were got by 
using linear interpolations of quarterly data, or if monthly data were available. Either way, given our 
dataset, we will not follow such procedure. 
32
 Deficit/GDP is the worst-performing fiscal variable in our baseline model, and interest 
payments/government revenues is not a monitored target for the Stability and Growth Pact. Hence, low 
debtors are Austria, France, Finland, the Netherlands and Spain. High debtors are Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal. The period under analysis for the decision is our sample period, 1999-2013. 
 16 
taken into account, as the debt/GDP ratio is given considerable importance. For the 
latter, debt/GDP fails to be significant along our dataset and more relevance seems to 
be given to short-term indicators. These results clearly support the idea that a 
systemic shock tends to have quite heterogeneous effects in EMU countries. The 
nature of such heterogeneity is conditional on the fiscal position of those countries, 
hence reinforcing the importance of the Maastricht criteria. Another relevant fact is 
that high debtors seem to be more exposed to general risk aversion, as the coefficient 
for the spread between US corporate and government bonds is consistently higher for 
them. On the other hand, liquidity is persistently more relevant for high debtors than 
for low debtors, given the magnitude of the coefficients. Finally, the variation of the 
expenditure with public servants seems to be statistically significant for the sub-
sample of low debtors, bearing the expected positive signal. A possible explanation 
for this phenomenon lies on the sample period under analysis. As the Global Financial 
Crisis erupted in 2008, high debtors may have been forced to cut public expenditure. 
Under that likely scenario, decreasing expenditures with public servants and 
increasing yield differentials may have coexisted, thus undermining the significance 
relationship proposed prior in our work. This is especially relevant if we admit that 
personnel expenditure cuts convey a stronger signal than personnel expenditure 




4.3. Credit Punishing Effects: 
A natural extension to our baseline specification is following Bayoumi et al. (1995) 
that described non-linear responses from interest rate spreads to changes in fiscal 
fundamentals as “credit punishing” effects. Table A.2 shows that we found little 
                                                        
33
 On the other hand, when we take the sub-sample of low debtors into account, we obtain a subtle 
positive correlation, that raises the question whether markets do punish what was above described as 
the lack of political and fiscal authority, or not. 
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statistical evidence of such phenomena in our sample. Although the coefficient on 
debt/GDP doubles relative to the one in Table 1, only one of the squared variables 
proves to be significant (interest payments/government revenues), which contrasts 
with the results of Bernoth et al. (2004, 2012). In part II of Table A.2 (p. 28) we 




The closing argument of section 4.2. begged the question whether our estimation 
results could be significantly influenced by the fact that our dataset comprises data 
both before and after 2008. Specifically, it is of extreme importance to unveil if 
markets reacted differently to unsound fiscal policies as the Global Financial Crisis 
erupted, and also the extent to which that happened, if it did. To help answering such 
questions we created two sets of new interaction variables. On the one hand, we 
included a dummy variable, Crisis, that takes the value of zero until the third quarter 
of 2008 and one henceforth
34
. Additionally, we interacted it with the three variables 
that try to capture the stance of fiscal policy. On the other hand, we interacted those 
same fiscal variables with our measure of general risk aversion, creating thus an 
alternative path to capture markets’ reaction to fiscal unsoundness when the Global 
Financial Crisis began. Table A.3 displays our results. From the analysis of column A 
(in part I) we conclude that a 10 percentage points increase in the debt/GDP ratio 
would yield a 24 basis points average increase in yield differentials until the third 
quarter of 2008, against a 29 basis points average increase afterwards. This may seem 
like a modest impact. However, by looking at column C, one can conclude that the 
                                                        
34
 The turning point is the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 18
th
 of September, 2008. 
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impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the interest payments/government revenues 
ratio is four times larger in the Crisis period
35
. Still, by looking at parts II and III of 
Table A.3 (pp. 30-31), one can extend this analysis to low and high debtors, following 
the aforementioned designation. The results are, indeed, impressive. Considering the 
same 1 percentage point increase in interest payments/government revenues, for a 
high debtor the Crisis burden converts an 11.5 basis points spread increase, into a 64.7 
basis points spread increase, whereas for a low debtor, it just changes from 3.1 to a 
10.4 basis points yield differential increase
36
. As to the interactions of fiscal variables 





4.5. A Two-period analysis: 
Given the results described above, we found interesting to further explore the 
comparison between the two relevant periods under analysis: pre-GFC and post-GFC. 
Hence, we computed our baseline specification as well as the extensions previously 
undertaken for the two different time periods. The first point that deserves our 
attention is the estimation of our baseline specification for the two time periods, 
shown in Table A.4. During the pre-crisis period, a 10 percentage points increase in 
debt/GDP would yield an average increase of 10 basis points on yield differentials. 
After this period however, the same 10 percentage points increase corresponded, on 
                                                        
35
 While for the period prior to the third quarter of 2008, we have an impact of 14.1 basis points; in the 
Crisis period this goes up to 57.1 basis points, on average.  
36 
 Also, while for low debtors the impact of the debt/GDP ratio seems not to be negatively affected by 
the Crisis event, for high debtors it almost doubles in the period after the third quarter of 2008. 
37  
Still, this is acceptable if one considers the time series of our measure of general risk aversion. In the 
first years of our sample (1999-2001), both yield differentials and fiscal fundamentals were quite 
moderate for EMU countries, as the Maastricht criteria had just been enforced (see Figure A.1. p.37). 
However, these were rough times for corporate America, namely due to events such as the burst of the 
dot.com bubble (March, 2010), Enron’s collapse (December, 2001) and also, to some extent, 9/11. 
Therefore, the spread between Moody’s Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US 
government bonds widened during these years, which may impact the significance of the 
aforementioned variables. 
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average, to a 44.5 basis points spread widening between the 10-year government bond 
yields of EMU countries and Germany. Strikingly enough, during that same period, a 
1 percentage point increase in interest payments/government revenues would result on 
an 86.7 basis points increase on yield differentials, whereas prior to the GFC this 
variable seemed statistically insignificant. Apart from the already mentioned spreads 
widening effect the GFC had by taking into account countries’ fiscal fundamentals, 
another phenomenon should be acknowledged. As risk perceptions increased, it seems 
that markets started pricing sovereign risk slightly differently. Indeed, interest 
payments/government revenues may have been given more weight as the bubble burst. 
A possible explanation is the fact that sustainability of public finances of EMU 
countries is mostly assessed by the debt/GDP and deficit/GDP ratios, the two 
variables for which caps were established by Maastricht. Hence, and as was noted by 
Bernoth et al. (2004), they have become highly politicized instruments and are 
possibly subject to creative accounting. By fearing that governments may mask the 
degree of their fiscal imbalances, markets may have felt the need to turn to other 
fiscal fundamentals
38
. Table A.5 displays the previously discussed data with yet 
another dimension: high and low debtors. By looking at the pre-GFC period (part I), 
we conclude that, for low debtors, a 10 and a 1 percentage points increases in 
debt/GDP and interest payments/government revenues lead to a 10 and a 5.7 basis 
points increases in yield differentials, respectively. Furthermore, we recognize that we 
fail to reject the null that such variables are insignificant to explain yield spreads for 
the group of high debtors. Nonetheless, if we consider the estimation results for the 
time period between the 3
rd
 quarter of 2008 and 2013 (part II), our conclusions will 
change dramatically. The effects that deteriorating fiscal fundamentals have on yield 
                                                        
38
 Note that both these results and this argument are consistent with the previous results from Table A.3. 
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spreads increased for low debtors, and are now colossal (and highly statistically 
significant) for the group of high debtors
39
. These so-called high debtors are a group 
of countries that tend to follow unsound fiscal policies, and did so ever since they 
stepped into the Eurozone. Notwithstanding, markets did not seem to take that into 
account while pricing those countries’ sovereign risk, and that may be the reason why 
we fail to have a statistically significant relationship in I.F and I.H. Figure A.1 (p. 37) 
proves that a substantial component of the risk associated with investing in high 
debtors’ sovereign instruments vanished in 1999, as they joined the EMU. Moreover, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) dubbed them as the countries in the EMU with the most 
severe track record in what concerns high inflation episodes, but not necessarily in 
what concerns past defaults
40
. Therefore, an erroneous message regarding high 
debtors sovereign risk may have been conveyed into the market as they became 
unable to use monetary policy. A second (and more convincing) explanation may lie 
in the lack of credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact’s rules, namely, the no-
bailout clause. As discussed by Balassone et al. (2004), the credibility of this clause 
should be closely linked with the capability of the whole system to sustain member 
states’ defaults. Probably the costs of bailing Portugal or France out outweigh the 
consequences of their failure. The difference may thus have been on the perceived 
ability to bailout one and the other. Previous extensions do not allow for any new 
findings when estimated with these datasets. Hence, and for the sake of parsimony, 
they will not be included in our work. 
                                                        
39
 In columns II.F and II.H one can confirm that a 10 percentage point increase in the debt/GDP ratio 
and a 1 percentage point increase in interest payments/government revenues, lead respectively to a 65 
and an 85.1 basis points average increase on yield differentials. 
40
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) gathered a very complete database of all historical crises in over 100 
world countries. If we take into account the EMU countries in 2002, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy 
and Portugal are the ones that had the greatest share of years since 1850 with inflation over 20 and 40%. 
The last four of this group comprise our group of high debtors. Data for Ireland is not presented in the 
book. As to the countries that spent more time in default or re-scheduling of their debts, we fail to 
confirm that our group of today’s high debtors corresponds to past high debtors. 
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4.6. Evidence from credit default swaps: 
Having followed a fixed-effects estimation procedure guaranteed the consistency of 
our estimates at the cost of preventing us to get a glimpse at individual time-invariant 
effects. These would encompass sources of unobserved individual heterogeneity such 
as countries’ reputation and trustworthiness. With this last extension from our 
baseline specification, we try to infer the extent to which those individual effects 
impact the way markets price sovereigns’ debt. Credit default swaps (CDS) are risk-
transferring contracts conceived to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income 
products between financial agents. The purchaser of the CDS should make period 
payments up until maturity to the swap seller. Should a default event occur, the CDS 
seller becomes liable for the difference between the face value and the recovery value 
of the fixed income asset. Hence, a CDS is considered insurance against non-payment. 
More importantly, and as described by Codogno et al. (2003), if applied to 
government bonds, it provides a market-based measure of the credit-risk premium. By 
including CDS spreads (relative to Germany) in our baseline model, we will be able 
to assess if the market is taking individual fixed-effects, or variables other than the 
ones included in the base case, into consideration when it prices countries’ credit risk. 
Table 2 portrays the results
41
. In it, the lagged CDS spread of country i relative to 
Germany is used, so as to control for reverse causality. As expected, the CDS spread 
is highly statistically significant. On the other hand, we fail to reject the null that each 
one of our three main fiscal variables is not significant to explain yield spreads. Hence, 
we conclude that CDS traders monitor closely these three fiscal variables when 
                                                        
41
 A one percentage point increase in the CDS spread leads to an average impact between 13.9 and 16.6 
basis points, depending on the specification considered. Also, it should be noted that this specification 
includes only Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and starts on the first quarter of 2003. 
Additionally, there are some missing values within this dataset. CDS data was taken from Bloomberg. 
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pricing sovereigns’ debt. Moreover, it tempts us to follow the argument that factors 
such as countries’ reputation and trustworthiness play a lower role than what was 
previously expected. 
Table 2. Baseline specification with credit default swaps 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany 
A   B   C   D 




























Debt/GDP 0.021 (0.84) 
 
0.028 (1.23) 
      
Deficit/GDP 0.051 (0.22) 
    
0.192 (1.09) 
   
Interest payments/ 
government revenues 




 0.141 (1.20) 
   
Variation of expenditure 
with public servants 
-0.010 (0.51)  -1.136 (0.55)  -0.006 (0.30)  -0.013 (0.54) 
   
            Econometric Controls 
           














            Relevant Statistics 
       














                        
Notes: 
           
(1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
(2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
10-year CDS data was gathered for Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain from 2003 to 2013. 
Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
         
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
The three main fiscal fundamentals and the CDS Spread were lagged one period to account for endogeneity. 
 
Overall, the estimation results presented in our work are in agreement with those of 
Bernoth et al. (2004, 2012) even though some of the extensions we tried do not yield 
significant results
42
. Yet, we believe our work presents a much robust econometric 
treatment of the data, as it controls for two very important sources of endogeneity in 
the literature of government bond yield spreads. The first one refers to the dynamic 
dimension of our panel. Indeed, the high z-statistics associated with the lagged 
dependent variable prove there could be severe omitted variable bias issues as a result 
                                                        
42
 The analysis of credit punishing effects, which Bernoth et al. (2004, 2012) found highly statistically 
significant, is an example of this. 
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of its exclusion. The second one is the threat reverse causality can pose. While 
lagging fiscal variables one period may weaken the robustness of our results, not 
doing it will probably affect its consistency.  
 
5. Final remarks and policy implications: 
Fourteen years after the inception of the EMU, government bond yield spreads have 
widened to the values of the early nineties, thus displaying the failure of one of the 
Euro’s flagships. More importantly, as the GFC erupted, some of Eurozone’s 
peripheral defaulted on their debts, thus magnifying the need to comprehend the 
determinants of yield spreads. Data on ten EMU countries from 1999 to 2013 allowed 
us to confirm the significance of both liquidity and fiscal fundamentals. By 
establishing two groups of countries based on their debt/GDP ratio, we could discern 
that markets do punish an unsound fiscal policy and pay a closer look at structural 
indicators for the high debtors group. With the extensions to our baseline specification, 
we did not find evidence of credit punishing effects. Furthermore estimation including 
credit default swaps leads us to call into question unobserved heterogeneity factors 
such as country’s reputation and trustworthiness. An important contribution of our 
work comes by disentangling the Crisis period in our dynamic panel dataset, whereby 
we conclude that before 2008, the pricing of peripheral sovereigns’ debt failed to 
punish irresponsible fiscal action. In that context, we propose two possible 
explanations. First, the fact that distrust regarding these countries used to come from 
monetary, rather than fiscal policy. Second, the fact that the Stability and Growth 
Pact’s rules, namely the no-bailout clause, although necessary were never credible. 
The second explanation bears important policy implications that we leave for future 
research. Our second contribution relates to our methodology, namely the tackling of 
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two very important sources of endogeneity. First, we allow for a dynamic adjustment 
of the dependent variable, thus precluding omitted variable bias issues. Second, by 
lagging our fiscal fundamentals one period, we control for reverse causality
43
. 
In the future, one expects developments in what concerns the methodology employed, 
given that panel methods for unit roots and cointegration are currently an active area 
of research. Furthermore, computation of new regressors possibly related to the 
ideological stance of the party/coalition leading member states’ governments should 
enable to scan the behaviour of residuals. With this report, we confirmed conclusions 
of previous works that fiscal responsibility is a necessary condition for yields’ 
convergence. Bearing that in mind, we propose two future research areas with policy-
making implications of great importance for the prosperity of the EMU. The first 
should try to explain the lagged markets’ reaction to deteriorating fiscal positions. 
Issues such as the design of the Stability and Growth Pact, creative accounting 
possibilities and the imperfectness of the information available in the markets at any 
given point in time should be tackled by both research and policy-making. The second 
should account for the lagged policy-makers’ reaction to market signals. Building on 
the works of Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Spolaore (2004), and adapting them to 







                                                        
43
 See section 3.2., p. 11 for a greater detail on this issue. 
44
 Alesina and Drazen (1991) develop a model that aims at explaining why are stabilizations delayed in 
a context where there are significant distributional implications. Spolaore (2004) develops another 
theoretical model in which agents dispute about the policy adjustment instrument to use in the 
aftermath of a shock. 
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Table A.1. Baseline specification for two different groups of countries: low debtors and high debtors 
 


































































Debt/GDP 0.015 (1.54) 
 
0.013 (1.33) 





      
Deficit/GDP -0.022 (1.21) 
    
0.029 (0.65) 
   
 
-0.072 (0.27) 
    
0.131 (1.09) 
   
Interest payments/ 
government revenues 




 0.025** (2.09) 
 




 0.392*** (5.06) 
   
 




0.007* (1.84)  0.007** (2.07)  0.007 (1.44)  0.007 (1.58) 
 
-0.060 (1.06)  -0.058 (1.12)  -0.067 (0.94)  -0.063 (1.14) 
   
 
   
                        Econometric Controls            
 
           






























                        Relevant Statistics        
 


















Observations 280   280   280   280  280   280   280   280 
  
           
            Notes:            
            (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
            (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
          Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.          
            Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
            The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity.   
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Table A.2. Baseline specification with credit punishing effects (Part I) 
 






















Debt/GDP 0.081* (1.69) 
      
Debt/GDP^2 -0.023 (1.27) 
      
Deficit/GDP 
   
0.109* (1.74) 
   
Deficit/GDP^2 
   
0.469 (0.66) 
   




 -0.108 (0.43) 
  




 2.061* (1.95) 
  
Variation of expenditure with public servants -0.035 (0.93)  -0.043 (0.88)  -0.037 (0.96) 
  
         Econometric Controls 
        










         Relevant Statistics 
     





Observations 560   560   560 
  
        
Notes: 
        
(1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
(2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
                        
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity. 
















                                                              Table A.2. Baseline specification with credit punishing effects (Part II) 
 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany 













































Debt/GDP 0.044 (0.99) 
 
      
0.113** (2.12) 
      
Debt/GDP^2 -0.026 (0.85) 
 
      
-0.033** (2.01) 





       
-0.043 (0.19) 





       
2.512 (1.39) 
   
Interest payments/ government 
revenues      




 0.361 (0.67) 
 
    
Interest payments/ government 
revenues^2      




 0.115 (0.06) 
 
    




0.006 (1.42)  0.006 (1.37)  -0.050 (1.04)  -0.069 (0.97)  -0.064 (1.11) 
 
    
                  Econometric Controls   
 
              






















                  Relevant Statistics  
 
         











Observations 280  280   280   280   280   280 
  
  
               Notes:   
               (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
      (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
      Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.                
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *.       
The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity.         
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Table A.3. Baseline specification including interactions with a Crisis dummy variable and the general risk-aversion measure (Part I) 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany 

















































Debt/GDP 0.024*** (3.72) 
       
0.022*** (5.45) 
 
      
Debt/GDP*Crisis 0.011** (2.40) 
         
 
      
Debt/GDP*Corp. Spread 
         
0.008 (1.61) 
 
      
Deficit/GDP 
   
-0.056 (0.69) 
      
 
-0.277* (1.84) 
    
Deficit/GDP*Crisis 
   
0.012 (0.06) 
      
 
      
Deficit/GDP*Corp. Spread 
           
 
0.249*** (3.43) 
    
Interest payments/ government revenues 
      
0.141*** (3.82) 
   
 




      
0.461*** (6.30) 
   
 
      
Interest/G.Revenues* Corporate Spread 
           
 
   
0.0547 (1.34) 
 

















   
 
      
                   Econometric Controls            
 
      
























                   Relevant Statistics        
 
    












Observations 560   560   560   560  560   560   
  
           
       Notes:            
       (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds.    
       (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11).    
       Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.            
       Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *.    
       The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity.       
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Table A.3. Baseline specification including interactions with a Crisis dummy variable and the general risk-aversion measure (Part II) 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany 













































Debt/GDP 0.014* (1.77) 
       
0.010 (1.21) 
      
Debt/GDP*Crisis 0.002** (1.96) 
               
Debt/GDP*Corp. Spread 
         
0.002 (1.50) 
      
Deficit/GDP 
   
0.028 (0.74) 
       
-0.073** (2.08) 
   
Deficit/GDP*Crisis 
   
0.082* (1.74) 
            
Deficit/GDP*Corp. Spread 
            
0.063 (1.34) 
   
Interest payments/ government revenues 
      
0.031** (2.18) 
       
0.050 (1.33) 
Interest/G.Revenues* Crisis 
      
0.073*** (5.79) 
         
Interest/G.Revenues* Corporate Spread 
               
-0.015 (0.72) 
















         
                  Econometric Controls 
                 






















                  Relevant Statistics 
           











Observations 280   280   280   280   280   280 
  
                 Notes: 
                 (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
         (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
         Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
                
                  
Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
         The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity. 
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Table A.3. Baseline specification including interactions with a Crisis dummy variable and the general risk-aversion measure (Part III) 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany  













































Debt/GDP 0.025*** (7.38) 
 




    
Debt/GDP*Crisis 0.021** (2.15) 
 




      
0.009 (0.98) 





       
-0.320* (1.81) 









         
0.279*** (3.87) 
   
Interest payments/ government revenues 
  
 
   
0.115*** (3.45) 





   
0.581*** (6.12) 
         
Interest/G.Revenues* Corporate Spread 
  
 
            
0.046 (0.69) 
















         
                  Econometric Controls   
 
              






















                  Relevant Statistics  
 
         











Observations 280  280   280   280   280   280 
  
                 Notes: 
                 (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
         (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
         Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
                 Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
         The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity. 
             
 32 
Table A.4. Baseline specification for two different time periods: pre-GFC (1999-2008, 2nd quarter) and post-GFC (2008, 3rd quarter-2013) 
 
































































Debt/GDP 0.008 (1.59) 
 
0.010** (2.15) 





      
Deficit/GDP -0.018 (1.20) 
    
-0.018 (0.95) 
   
 
-0.261 (0.53) 
    
-0.154 (0.31) 
   
Interest payments/ 
government revenues 




 0.017 (1.26) 
 




 0.867*** (9.28) 
   
 
   
Variation of expenditure 
with public servants 
0.002 (0.60)  0.002 (0.65)  0.002 (0.43)  0.002 (0.50) 
 
-0.058 (0.85)  -0.100 (0.96)  -0.100 (0.84)  -0.056 (0.92) 
   
 
   
                        Econometric Controls            
 
           






























                        Relevant Statistics        
 
       















Observations 359   359   359   359  180   180   180   180 
  
           
            Notes:            
            (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
            (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
            Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.          
            Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
            The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity.   




Table A.5. Baseline specification for two different time periods: pre-GFC (1999-2008, 2nd quarter) and post-GFC (2008, 3rd quarter-2013), and two different groups of countries: low debtors and high debtors (Part I) 
 

































































Debt/GDP 0.004 (0.17) 
 
0.010*** (3.47) 





      
Deficit/GDP 0.021 (1.18) 
    
0.023 (1.32) 
   
 
-0.033 (1.43) 
    
-0.039 (1.29) 
   
Interest payments/ 
government revenues 




 0.057*** (5.24) 
 




 -0.003 (0.20) 
   
 
   
Variation of expenditure 
with public servants 
0.005* (1.72)  0.006** (1.97)  0.006 (1.59)  0.005 (1.79) 
 
0.002 (0.49)  0.002 (0.52)  0.001 (0.28)  0.002 (0.38) 
   
 
   
                        Econometric Controls            
 
           






























                        Relevant Statistics        
 
       















Observations 180   180   180   180  179   179   179   179 
  
           
            Notes:            
            (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
            (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
            Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis.          
            Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
            The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity.   
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Table A.6. Baseline specification for two different time periods: pre-GFC (1999-2008, 2nd quarter) and post-GFC (2008, 3rd quarter-2013), and two different groups of countries: low debtors and high debtors (Part II) 
 
Yield differential of country i relative to Germany 
 II. post-GFC 
 Low debtors  High debtors 









































      
 Deficit/GDP -0.157*** (4.96)     -0.086*** (2.88)    
 
-0.261 (0.50) 
    
-0.144 (0.26) 
   
 Interest payments/ 
government revenues 




 0.170*** (6.88) 
 




 0.851*** (7.31) 
    
 
   
 Variation of expenditure 
with public servants 
0.007 (0.90)  0.006 (0.86)  0.008 (0.89)  0.006 (0.77) 
 
-0.162 (1.57)  0.260 (1.26)  0.268 (1.05)  -0.158* (1.93) 
    
 
   
                          Econometric Controls            
 
           


















                          Relevant Statistics        
 
       









 Observations 90   90   90   90  90   90   90   90 
   
                        Notes: 
                        (1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
             (2) Second order serial correlation test of the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure (see equation 4, p. 11). 
             Absolute z-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
                      Significance at 1% denoted by ***; significance at 5% denoted by **; significance at 10% denoted by *. 
             The three main fiscal fundamentals were lagged one period to account for endogeneity. 




















Table A.6. Summary of statistics: baseline specification 
        
Variables Observations Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. - Max Expectation 
        
Dependent Variable 
       
Yield differential 590 1.04054 2.63695 -0.087 - 30.875 N/A 
        Lagged yield differential 590 1.04054 2.63695 -0.087 - 30.875 + 
Corporate Spread (1) 590 1.61374 0.50022 0.622 - 2.6747 + 
CDS Spread (2) 210 1.27378 3.60607 -0.097 - 44.919 + 
Liquidity 590 7.70620 8.63661 0 - 31.552 - 
Debt/GDP 570 76.4480 28.7869 26.89166 - 175.3458 + 
Deficit/GDP 580 0.77065 1.17102 -2.09231 - 9.41639 + 
Interest payments/ 
government revenues 
579 7.4768 3.5129 1.90249 - 18.3846 + 
Variation of expenditure 
with public servants 
570 0.8434 2.1611 -16.956 - 16.097 + 
        Econometric Controls 
       GDP growth 570 0.8226 1.3986 -4.4516 - 14.163 - 
        Notes:               
(1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds. 
(2) The summary of statistics for the CDS Spread encompasses a different dataset than the default one, on which 
the other summary statistics were calculated upon. Its statistics correspond to the period of 2003-2013 for 
Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table A.7. Correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables 
             
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
             1 Yield differential 1.00           
2 Lagged yield differential 0.93 1.00 
         
3 Corporate Spread (1) 0.21 0.19 1.00 
        
4 CDS Spread (2) 0.86 0.81 0.20 1.00 
       
5 Liquidity -0.08 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 1.00 
      
6 Debt/GDP 0.52 0.52 0.12 0.48 0.38 1.00 
     
7 Deficit/GDP 0.44 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.05 0.49 1.00 
    
8 Interest payments/ government revenues 0.31 0.29 0.10 0.42 0.27 0.81 0.33 1.00 
   
9 Variation of expenditure with public servants -0.29 -0.27 -0.07 -0.24 -0.03 -0.22 -0.25 -0.06 1.00 
  
10 GDP growth -0.38 -0.38 -0.35 -0.40 -0.05 -0.23 -0.32 -0.01 0.28 1.00 
 
11 Crisis 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.30 -0.01 0.32 0.52 -0.07 -0.28 0.50 1.00 
             Notes:                       
 
(1) Yield spread between Moody's Seasoned US AAA corporate bonds and 10-year US government bonds 
 
(2) The summary of statistics for the CDS Spread encompasses a different dataset than the default one, on which the other summary statistics were 











Figure A.1. Government bond yield spreads relative to Germany 
 











where is a  matrix with t
th
 row  is a 
 vector with t
th




where . Lags of  or  can additionally be used as 
instruments if deemed necessary. 
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